ABSTRACT
Students of interparty conflict and decision-making have approached their subject matter with the craftsmanlike skill of the experimentalist seeking analytical refinement as well as with the broad sweep of the model builder seeking total integration. In this chapter, the authors describe aspects of a large research program which reflects their concern for constructing models of conflict of some generality and their concern for designing situations that permit a high degree of analytical rigor in assessing hypotheses. The methodological approach consists of a juxtaposition of model construction, simulation, and experimentation. A general model of components of interparty decision-making is explored by an experiment which is embedded within the context of a simulation of an interreligious decision-making council. The distinction between ideology and utilities as sources of conflict in decision-making has been made by a number of scholars with reference to numerous contexts: example, international negotiations; cleavages in legislative politics; legal institutions. Power is typically expressed in terms of control over resources.
