ABSTRACT
A highly visible economic crisis gripped the Soviet Union during the last three years of its existence. Western reporting from Moscow told stories of long lines, empty shelves, and fear of starvation. Poor economic performance alone cannot directly and immediately destroy a political system. The core legitimation of Soviet rule was provided by the Marxist thesis that public ownership of the means of production, and the unified direction of production toward public objectives, would make a socialist economy more efficient than a capitalist one, with its anarchic pursuit of private gain. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Abram Bergson used these calculations to analyze the sources of growth. Gorbachev's initial economic policies were characterized by strong push, poor preparation, and rapid succession–a "Napoleonic preference for action" in Phillip Hanson's words. Command policies are blunt but frequently effective tools, with strong side effects. Market-oriented reform held special fascination for most Western Sovietologists.
