ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the economic factors underlying the army's proven loyalty to the regime by looking at its economic activities since the military coup in 1970. It focuses on socioeconomic developments within the Syrian military prior to the Uprising. The chapter investigates the military's economic interests by analysing the different developmental stages of the military economic institution since 1970, and by tracing the relations between officers and private businesses as well as the illicit economic activities of the military. It takes up the question as to whether the proven loyalty of the military to the regime during the Uprising and thereafter can be explained by the tight economic connections between the regime inner core and the officer corps. The chapter concludes by addressing the effects of the militarization of the state by the Syrian military. Elizabeth Picard and Sadiq al-Azm used the terms "military mercantile complex" to describe the clientelist networks between military officers and new businessmen.
