Situations, emotions and character within a situated approach to emotions
The chapter argues that emotional reflexivity is crucial for understanding the role of emotions in moral situations. It begins by showing how different theoretical perspectives of emotions deal with meta-emotions and their role in moral situations, arguing for the insightful theoretical position of a situated approach to emotions (Griffiths and Scarantino, 2009; Mendonça, 2012; Stephan, 2012; Stephanet al., 2014). It then takes up the discussion on the Situationist debate between Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology (Upton, 2009), proposing that its resolution lies in adopting situation as a technical term, distinct from context, and by recognising how emotions play a determinant role in evaluating and classifying situations. The chapter concludes by pointing out that adopting a situated approach to emotions recognises the plural and varied role of emotions and opens the path to establishing the place of character in situations.