ABSTRACT
The topic of ethical vagueness is a relatively neglected topic in metaethics. It certainly has received nothing like the attention spent on ethical judgments about what is, example determinately right or wrong, and what it would be for there to be such a determinate ethical fact. As such, it is a topic on which there is still much work to be done. Research so far has focused primarily on what ethical realists and expressivists could say about ethical vagueness. It seems unlikely that the final word has been said about either metaethical position. In particular, there remain interesting questions concerning whether accounting for ethical vagueness is easier or harder for the various positions that fly under the ethical realist banner. In addition, could an expressivist give a semantic account of ethical vagueness—something she might feel pressured to do if she gave a semantic account of non-ethical vagueness? Moreover, ethical realism and expressivism do not exhaust the metaethical terrain.
