ABSTRACT
The Frege-Geach problem arises for any view that takes force or analogous notions, such as expression, to explain content. Many theorists have taken the Frege-Geach problem to be the task of specifying a relationship of validity or inference which applies to statements when their content is understood in terms of force or expression. This chapter focuses on the Frege-Geach problem for expressivism about moral or normative thought and talk, putting other contexts to the side. An account of the content of embedded expressions, say in terms of states of mind, need not be reversible in the sense of providing an expression which corresponds to every state of mind. Expressivists have been less than fully clear about whether their program is semantic or metasemantic and less than fully clear about what they take linguistic meaning to be. Hybrid expressivists claim that assertions of normative sentences express both descriptive beliefs and conative states.
