ABSTRACT
A significant part of metaethics, or metanormative theory, can be seen as the project of trying to make sense of this duality in ethical thought and talk. This chapter offers an overview of hybrid views, starting with the cognitivist ones. Some hybrid cognitivists have proposed that ethical terms function roughly as slurs do, and that both could be understood in terms of conventional implicatures. The idea that moral utterances conventionally express motivational attitudes along with representational beliefs faces a number of challenges, which at the very least importantly restrict the options available to a hybrid cognitivist. According to pure expressivists, some ethical thinking consists solely in having certain desire-like attitudes. According to hybrid expressivism, all ethical thinking consists of having desire-like attitudes as well as suitably related beliefs. Even if hybrid expressivism offers resources for dealing with some of the hard problems for expressivists, it remains to be seen how it deals with the rest.
