ABSTRACT
Simon Kirchin's wide-ranging and thought-provoking chapter describes and discusses several of his moral and metaethical claims. When Kirchin discusses his assumptions about what he calls moral methodology, he partly endorses Wolf's objection that, rather than considering moral principles at a general level, he ought instead to appeal to our intuitive beliefs about particular cases. Kirchin later partly endorses Allen Wood's objection that, rather than appealing to our intuitive beliefs about particular cases, he ought instead to consider moral principles at a general level. According to one revised version of Rule Consequentialism, which Portmore calls PFRC: everyone ought to follow the rules whose being followed, not only by everyone but by any other number of people, would make things go best. In her agreeably humane and sensible chapter, Julia Driver writes that she is not criticizing her defence of the view that there are some irreducibly normative truths, such as the truth that some things matter in a reason-implying sense.
