ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on Parfit's case against the most promising version of naturalism about the normative-a view that Parfit calls "Non-Analytical Naturalism" (NAN). Parfit has three main named arguments against NAN: The Normativity Objection, The Fact-Stating Argument, and the Triviality Objection. The chapter also focuses on the Triviality Objection. Parfit's Triviality Objection purports to show that NANs are unable to do so much as state informative identities between the normative and the natural, which, if true, would show that the normative is nothing over and above the natural. The chapter shows that Parfit's argument fails to rule out some NAN views and thus his Non-Naturalist Cognitivism is significantly less well supported by his arguments. The conclusion of Parfit's Triviality Objection is not merely that no Non-Analytical Naturalist position is true. Rather it is that the NAN cannot so much as state her position in a way that meets the requirements for being a candidate for an informative truth.
