ABSTRACT
Critics of the concepts of postsecularity and postsecularism typically object to the terminology’s analytical vagueness, its distance from concrete empirical and political problems of the day, and its embrace of theoretical and normative positions that are substantively different from one other. These charges are weighty. Yet, such critiques tend to assume that, by comparison, the older-style notions of secularity and secularism, religion and theology, remain stable. This is no longer the case, if it ever was. And it should be acknowledged that postsecular thought—across its many variants—has had considerable impact in disrupting conceptual rigidity and normative polarization across this spectrum (McLennan 2010a). Accordingly, new articulations of the philosophy-politics-religion relationship often resist easy classification as secular(ist), or postsecular(ist), or religious—seeing as opposition to strict secularism is frequently formulated as a defence of religiosity, even when evidence of devout belief is slight.
