ABSTRACT
Introduction The conceptualization of the political regime of Moldova as a neopatrimonial one is not common in Moldova despite of the existence of a range of factors which permit to qualify it as such. Institutional ambiguity, systemic corruption, systematic favoritism, a lack of separation between politics and economics, personalization, predominance of informal institutions over the formal ones (etc.) are factors which can easily be detected in this country. However, journalists and political commentators prefer to characterize Moldova as an oligarchy or a “captured state” (Tirdea & Ciobanu, 2013, p. 480). These authors argue that, in fact, reforms have done little to mitigate the state capture epitomized by private and party interests controlling state institutions, thus continuing to threaten Moldova’s democracy. This implies that private actors significantly influence the state decision-making processes to their own private advantage through illicit and unobvious channels. The influence is exerted through a range of state institutions, including the legislature, executive, ministries and the judiciary. In addition to this, the system is seen as being dominated by a few rich people who control the process of distribution of benefits in Moldovan society. As such, the country is characterized in the Aristotelian vein as the rule of a few rich for their own benefit.
