ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that reasons pluralism does not imply that all conflicts among normative reasons of different types are irresolvable. Normative practical reasons are said to have varying degrees of strength or weight. Strength is a feature which enables us to resolve some conflicts among normative practical reasons. The chapter presents a rationale for the Override Principle. This rationale draws on Aristotle's conception of practical wisdom. The chapter suggests that the virtue of practical wisdom, as Aristotle construed it, is needed to recognize different types of rationally incomparable reasons which correspond to different types of rationally incomparable goods. It identifies some considerations in support of the reasons-pluralist claim that normative practical reasons of different types are not rationally comparable. The chapter introduces the Override Principle to show that even given reasons pluralism, it is possible to resolve some conflicts among reasons of different types. It illustrates some applications of the Override Principle, and addresses a number of objections against it.
