ABSTRACT
Sextus Empiricus was a late second century Pyrrhonist, a radical sceptic, who claimed no knowledge. In fact, he claimed no beliefs. He would therefore not assert anything about the meaning of life, or whether there is one. Sextus guides us through the paradigmatic Aenesideman modes that lead to suspension of belief. He starts by juxtaposing appearances of different observers and thinkers at different instances, suggesting that one can match any appearance with a contrary appearance. Sextus uses the notion of persuasion to explain what happens. When confronted with contrary appearances, he tells us that the sceptic suspends belief because of equipollence. Sextus emphasizes the passivity of the sceptic's appearances. Sextus records an importation into Pyrrhonism of a distinction between the evident and the non-evident that is between observing the evident and inferring the non-evident. Pyrrhonism is therapeutic like medicine. The Empiricist explanation of the origins of treatments is, like that of the Pyrrhonists, given in terms of chance.
