ABSTRACT
In Chevron, and in the context of construing the meaning of the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act, the Court articulated a framework for governing the degree of deference to be afforded a federal agency in interpreting and implementing statutes. The framework – a seemingly simple two-step scheme – asks first whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue in question. If so, the reviewing court is to give effect to Congress’s expressed intent. Any agency interpretation in conflict with that intent is invalid. If, on the other hand, Congress’s intent is unclear, or if it has remained silent, then step two of the framework requires that the reviewing court defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of the statutory language at issue. This analysis has proven to be anything but simple and flies in the face of an elemental component of our democratic system: that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches serve as checks and balances against one another. In addition to introducing a confusing and inconsistently applied framework for reviewing agency interpretations and decisions,
the Chevron decision essentially invited courts to woodenly defer to agency action and to relinquish their obligation to “say what the law is.”
