ABSTRACT
In Gilbert, a class of women employed by General Electric brought a Title VII claim against the company on the ground that the comprehensive disability plan offered by General Electric excluded coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities. The Court rejected the women’s claim of discrimination, finding that Title VII does not encompass pregnant women because the act only protected against discrimination based on sex. Because the plan’s pregnancy exclusion was based on the distinction between pregnant and nonpregnant persons and not on a distinction between women and men, the exclusion was not discriminatory. As the dissent correctly recognized, the Court’s refusal to acknowledge that pregnancy-based discrimination is, in fact, sex-based discrimination was both illogical and flew in the face of evidence substantiating that the
denial of pregnancy-based benefits had significantly and negatively affected women’s employment opportunities and financial status. The Court’s determination that Title VII required only that the sexes be treated equally, rather than that they both receive the same opportunities, smacks of the same misguided thinking that resulted in Plessy v. Ferguson. In ruling as it did, the Court relinquished its obligation to protect individual rights and to promote equality in favor of advancing stereotypes and deep-seated prejudices against women.
