ABSTRACT
This chapter seeks to underpin the logic of the action, the anatomy of Strategic Communications (StratCom) and the challenges ahead. It points the fact that armed forces mistakenly relied on StratCom as a weapon. Recently, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member states tried to combine all official communication activity of the operational realm under one roof, StratCom. The resulting domination in terms of NATO's strategic alignment has led to a situation in which American military concepts have been adopted by European partners more easily. According to Michael Desch, a pioneer of civil-military relations theory, civilian control does not work when the military sphere regularly interferes in decision-making. Germany agreed in principle to NATO's StratCom, which must be understood as political and subordinate guidelines, without verifying, however, its compatibility with the national communication concepts in advance. A closer look at Germany and France shows how the patterns of civil-military relations shaped the outcome of StratCom in the NATO member states.
