ABSTRACT

The Paris Conference of Parties (COP) has sought to initiate a global regime for the mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and, where necessary, adaptation to them. The governance challenges are immense – in the governance of the negotiations, in the governance of the complex set of mechanisms that those negotiations are generating, in the integrity mechanisms to ensure as far as possible that those mechanisms fulfil their functions (leading to a rudimentary Global Carbon Integrity System/Regime). 1 In the light of the dynamic relations between state and non-state actors within the climate negotiations, there is a growing recognition that more research is needed to explore the social dimensions of governance quality in climate mechanisms, particularly around decision-making processes. These take note of the social-political nature of climate governance and explore governance quality by looking at the participatory structures, deliberative processes, substantive products, and longer-term outcomes as the determinants of regime effectiveness. 2 Effectiveness is understood as the measure of institutional performance against a set of desired objectives. 3

and constitute a ‘thick’ set of governance values, as outlined late in this chapter and more extensively in Chapter 2 . Following the approach delineated there, the governance quality of the climate regime is not attributed to any single institutional arrangement, such as transparency, even though this is, of course, important. Evaluating the performance of an institution on the basis of a restricted set of values would constitute a somewhat ‘thin’ assessment; consequently this volume explores some of the broader parameters affecting quality of governance and institutional integrity and their possible impacts on the policy responses to climate change.