ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the background to Russia's 'Eastern' turn - particularly towards China - in response to Western sanctions over Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Beyond rediscovering a Eurasian vocation, Russia has a second more general deep-seated foreign policy priority. The crisis over Crimea sped up rather than launched the turn to the East. During the previous decade, Russia and China had signed two important contracts for an oil pipeline to the Far East. The Russian and Chinese militaries continued to expand their joint exercises. In 2015, the Russian and Chinese navies conducted joint naval exercises in the South China Sea and the Mediterranean. The Russian referendum in Crimea to legitimize the annexation is of no consolation at all to the PRC since this could be used as a precedent in Taiwan. The increase in trade between Russia and China countries has continued to fail to live up to the very optimistic targets set by Presidents Putin and Xi.
