ABSTRACT
At least since Aristotle, a sharp distinction has been drawn between the pragmatic and the theoretical attitudes. This chapter describes these attitudes in terms of their motivations and presuppositions. Such suspension recalls the paradoxical nature of the freedom that is exercised in the theoretical attitude. Freedom is used to suspend our freedom. The freedom that is at the origin of our choices, the freedom that lines our world, is an Ab-grund, something that it is senseless to seek a cause for. Pragmatism, both in its origin and its revival, has often been taken as a purely American product. Less well known, however, is its presence in the works of such European figures as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Patocka. Pragmatism attempts to solve these difficulties by denying their premises. Disclosure, it asserts, is not achieved by representation, but rather through practical activities. The chapter concludes by considering Levinas' defense of the second alternative.
