ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the theoretical foundations of coalition formation in relation to Turkey's experience by first introducing a theoretical narrative to understand why coalition governments in Turkey have been less durable than single-party majority governments. The former often promotes proportional electoral systems that tend to produce coalition governments based on deliberation while the latter is associated with majoritarian systems and single-party governments. Behavioural studies provide crucial insights for understanding coalition probabilities and the mindsets of leaders. These studies are directly linked to decision-making processes and extremely useful for interpreting coalition negotiations in the Turkish case. Coalition discussions can be analysed in various ways, but the role of leaders and degree of uniformity of opinion within a party are critical. In new democracies, the mass public may believe coalition governments offer greater potential for accountability than an authoritarian past. The most significant coalitions were formed between the Milli Selamet Partisi and the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, and the so-called Nationalist Front governments.
