ABSTRACT
Whether selecting their first cabinet or making changes in their cabinet personnel, U.S. presidents rarely use cabinet appointments to reach out to the opposing party. Negotiating policy in a system of separated institutions that share power, and confronting only one opposing party, the chief executive in the United States has few incentives to bring members of that party into the administration leading to a unilateral portfolio allocation and design (PAD) strategy. In this chapter we show that this practice has been upheld, with few exceptions, even when the president’s party has lost control of Congress, when the economy has contracted, and when the president’s approval rating has fallen. If the opposing party controls a chamber in the legislature, for example, it has veto power over the president’s policy proposals—it does not need access to the president from within the cabinet to exercise power. Meanwhile, the president does not want to lose control over policy implementation by conceding a department to the opposition. But despite predominantly unilateral PAD strategies, many appointees are partisans. U.S. presidents also appoint many cabinet members with whom they have personal connections and appointees typically have expertise in their policy area.
