ABSTRACT
Presidents are elected to get the job done. Ministers are central to this process, but so is Congress. Whenever possible, presidents prefer to act unilaterally because it is less costly and more effective. However, when presidents lack a legislative majority, cooperation and compromise are required to push policy forward. In this chapter, we argue that Colombian presidents have responded to the changing nature of party politics by devising ways to reduce agency loss and cope with the tradeoff between support and loyalty. Particularly in the recent past, presidents have used the power to change the structure of the presidential office to curtail the ability of ministers to enact policies contrary to what the Executive prefers. By doing so, we suggest that presidents may engage in “bait and switch” tactics inviting other parties to the cabinet, while at the same time limiting the ability of ministers to affect policy. Our detailed description of cabinet politics in Colombia between 1958 and 2014 allows us to show that minority presidents and those who must invite other parties into their cabinets are likelier to engage in collaborative portfolio allocation strategies.
