ABSTRACT
Introduction: the EU as an external promoter of institutional change Since the formal launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003-04, the European Union (EU) has been aiming at creating a stable and prosperous neighbourhood by inducing rule convergence in its Eastern neighbours on the basis of European values. Yet, even in sectors with favourable conditions for rule transfer, the EU’s policies have led to contradictory outcomes in ENP countries such as Ukraine (see Langbein 2013, 2015). The main question that this chapter addresses is why rule convergence has varied at the sectoral level in Ukraine. To answer it, this study looks at the EU’s strategies of inducing change in the environment and migration sectors, with an emphasis on the example of anti-corruption policies. The chapter argues that policies promoting the empowerment of non-state stakeholders and the flexibility of rule-making facilitate the emergence of domestically sustainable institutional solutions and change. Flexible policies, instead of ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions (or ‘institutional monocropping’) allow the EU to take into account the existing institutional diversity and to devise solutions that are adapted to local needs. The inclusion of non-state stakeholders, which provide relevant knowledge and local legitimization by co-sponsoring change, facilitates implementation. Moreover, the empowerment of non-state actors and their active participation in designing institutions help to control state actors and avoid the emergence of single gatekeepers – the domestic actor(s), which control the state institution(s) and most of the sector’s resources and benefits and partially redistribute them as rents to their clients. Yet, the EU neglects domestic actors and promotes change mainly through institutional monocropping. As the literature shows, EU policies are generally guided by attempts to transfer its own rules and procedures to the target state through policy conditionality, socialization and capacity building (see Korosteleva 2012; Langbein 2015; Börzel and Ademmer 2013; Gstöhl 2008). Adequate incentives are expected to overcome the domestic costs of adaptation (Schimmelfennig
2008), social learning gradually changes the preferences of the domestic actors (Checkel 2001; Sasse 2008) and capacity building provides the state with the necessary domestic instruments to implement and enforce the adopted rules (Börzel and Risse 2012). This literature, with its focus on elites and its rather strong EU-centrism, fails to fully account for the role played by local actors and processes in the ENP context. This chapter therefore strives to go beyond topdown, outcome-oriented Europeanization by adding insights from the literature on international development and transnationalization to explain the varying policy convergence in different sectors. Driven by local demand and empowering domestic stakeholders, a process-oriented Europeanization leads to better explanations and policy results. In the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries, the EU induces change by providing incentives and by socializing elites such as via a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) or a Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP) as major examples of rule transfer triggers (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009). The EU thus offers credible incentives, clear goals, monitoring and capacity-building assistance. Yet, despite the presence of favourable conditions, this action results in varying outcomes at the sectoral level. This variation is explained by the difference of the strategies of rule-making and empowerment employed by the EU in different sectors. Ukraine is one of the most active reformers and largest recipients of EU support. The EU plays a crucial role in inducing change and in designing and implementing reforms. This external support is coupled with growing domestic demand. Since February 2014, the reforms have become a top priority on domestic and international agendas, and anti-corruption reforms in particular have been highlighted as the most important goal. The resulting societal awareness and interest in institutional change created a possibility for broader empowerment and public participation in rule-making and monitoring. The environment and migration sectors are selected as case studies here due to the presence of strong incentives, clear goals, assistance and monitoring – necessary conditions for change outlined in EU studies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Kelley 2006; Vachudova 2005). The puzzle is that, despite similar conditions, Ukraine’s responses to the EU’s demands for good governance have varied in the migration and environmental sectors. These cases were also chosen deliberately as examples of an unsuccessful case (migration) and a relatively successful case (the environment) of reforms in the fight against corruption. The focus on corruption is explained by its importance to international and domestic agendas and to the transformation of Ukraine’s system of governance. Anti-corruption policy represents a key pillar of the EU’s good governance reforms and is on top of domestic reform agendas. Corruption in both sectors is the main obstacle to reforms and the main target for the EU and for the Ukrainian public. Finally, Ukraine’s domestic conditions are similar to those of other post-Soviet states and face similar domestic and external challenges (see Levitsky and Way 2006). This may make it possible to extend the main argument and findings to the other countries of the Eastern Partnership.
