ABSTRACT
Introduction This chapter explores the Russian Federation’s perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a way to attenuate the auto-referential literature on the foreign policy of the European Union (EU). Therefore, the chapter proposes an alternative perspective on the ENP by looking at Russia, a major adversary of that policy. The external political context in which the EU operates is also – and to a large extent – defined by the intentions and actions of other actors. The pluralization of points of view in the analysis of the ENP is expected to suggest new theoretical avenues. Russia in particular has historically played a relevant role in the Eastern and South Caucasian countries included in the ENP, and is determined to hold a strong influence in the region. Russia’s perspective is also very relevant given the mounting tension since 2013 between Moscow and Brussels originating from the competition over the control of the post-Soviet space. While the European Union has presented the ENP as a normative project, Russia sees it as a power politics plan aimed at extending the EU’s influence over its own ‘near abroad’. The Kremlin has consequently reacted to the strengthening, in particular, of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – the Eastern dimension of the ENP – which is interpreted in a way that clashes with the European normative discourse. This chapter adopts an ‘outside-in’ perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy by investigating Russia’s posture towards the ENP/EaP and tracing it back to the major fluctuations in the country’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. This is an important perspective in light of the Euro-centrism in much of the ENP literature. The rapid and dramatic transformations, at both a systemic and a domestic level, which have challenged Russia – from the Russian Empire to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) and the Russian Federation – in a relatively short lapse of time, have impacted on the way the country has evolved and on what might threaten or motivate it in the future. Russia’s foreign policy conception and practice have been profoundly revised as a result of the end of the bipolar Cold War paradigm, of Communism and of the centrally planned economy and the deep structural changes within society, including the redefinition of national identity. The concomitant systemic,
cognitive and domestic modifications have over time produced various patterns of foreign policy orientations which hardly match a single theoretical approach. These orientations have been re-forged according to the leadership in power and the ambitions set for the country, which have also been adopted to respond to the external opportunities and perceived threats. It is argued that Russia’s reaction to these transformations can best be explained by a neoclassical realist approach, since neither neorealism nor constructivism can alone account for the dynamism, complexity and mutability of Russia’s foreign policy. The country’s external projection has shifted from cooperation with the West to competition − not only for re-establishing its leverage in the post-Soviet space but also for being recognized as a major power and filling the country’s vacuum of purpose derived from its loss of status. For this reason, Russian leadership has set targets which do not always reflect the country’s capabilities. Moreover, the increasing use of foreign policy for domestic reasons seems to overturn the neorealist principle that the international system determines the countries’ external conduct. Against this backdrop, neoclassical realism, which considers the interplay of systemic and unit-level variables in shaping a state’s foreign policy, seems the most suitable approach to explain Russia’s posture towards the ENP/EaP. It emphasizes systemic factors as well as cognitive and domestic factors as a common set of intervening variables transmitting systemic constraints into foreign policy. In particular, this approach takes into consideration other relevant features, such as history, ideas, beliefs and identity, which count in the way Russia interacts with the external environment. Although Russia appears to have traditionally acted according to (neo)realist assumptions as far as the ENP is concerned, its behaviour is not simply based on the structure of the international system but also on history, identity and perceptions of the ‘Other’ such as the EU, the United States (US) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia is definitely a self-interested and pragmatic actor but role shifts or varying identities belie the simplistic assumption of rationality under which states only pursue survival and power. As an approach still under construction, neoclassical realism allows an understanding of some aspects of Russia’s behaviour that deserve further exploration and theorization. The chapter starts with the examination of (neo)realism and its variations and constructivism as promising theoretical approaches for understanding Russia’s foreign policy and its attitude towards the ENP. It emerges that the complexity of Russia’s external posture requires a multi-theoretical approach that neoclassical realism incorporates by blending systemic, cognitive and domestic considerations. Neoclassical realism is then used as the theoretical framework to analyse Russia’s foreign policy evolution including the conception of the post-Soviet space. The examination of Russia’s role in that region is conducted in an ‘interactive’ way by looking at the interplay between Moscow and Brussels in a diachronic perspective. The cognitive discrepancy (normative versus power politics) between the two entities as regards the EaP partners/‘near abroad’ countries is discussed, before concluding.
