ABSTRACT
In this article, Gerald Dworkin (a contemporary philosopher unrelated to Ronald Dworkin) considers Mill’s strong antipaternalism. He offers some reasons for thinking that utilitarianism cannot ground the near-absolute prohibition on paternalism that Mill defends, and he considers a second strand of thought in Mill that rejects paternalism on the grounds that it is incompatible with autonomy and the value of free choice itself. Dworkin argues, contrary to Mill, that in a significant range of cases paternalistic interference with the liberty of individuals for their own good can be justified. For if paternalism is generally problematic because it interferes with the value of free choice, nevertheless we may be justified in restricting the freedom of individuals to make decisions the consequences of which are “far-reaching, potentially dangerous and irreversible.” This will be especially true if the consequences are likely to significantly undermine the person’s ability to make free, rational, and autonomous choices in the future.
