ABSTRACT

This book provides a comprehensive narrative history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, from 1942 to 1975--with a concluding section that traces U.S.-Vietnam relations from the end of the war in 1975 to the present. Unlike most general histories of U.S.  involvement in Vietnam--which are either conventional diplomatic or military histories--this volume synthesizes the perspectives to explore both dimensions of the struggle in greater depth, elucidating more of the complexities of the U.S.-Vietnam entanglement. It explains why Americans tried so hard for so long to stop the spread of Communism into Indochina, and why they failed. Key topics: The Fall of Saigon: The End as Prelude. Vietnam: A Place and A People. The Elephant and the Tiger. An Experiment in Nation Building. Raising the Stakes. Going to War. The Chain of Thunders. The Year of the Monkey. A War to End a War. The End of the Tunnel. Market: For anyone curious to know about the long American involvement in Southeast Asia, 1942-1975.   

chapter 2|41 pages

THE FRENCH INDOCHINA WAR, 1946–54

chapter 3|36 pages

AMERICA’S DIEM EXPERIMENT

chapter 5|40 pages

AMERICA GOES TO WAR, 1964–65

chapter 6|36 pages

WAGING LIMITED WAR IN VIETNAM, 1965–68

chapter 10|37 pages

NIXON’S VIETNAM WAR, 1969–71

chapter 11|28 pages

NIXON’S VIETNAM WAR, 1971–73

chapter 13|18 pages

LEGACIES OF A WAR