ABSTRACT
This chapter’s objective is to highlight, and think through, the role of obligation in comprehending social rights in the context of the changing nature of the welfare state. There are two reasons for this focus. The first concerns the “social” dimension of social rights. References to social rights often assume one of two meanings. On the one hand, the “social” denotes a series of fundamental goods that human beings need access to in order to live: a home, health care, an education, and security of income, for example. Collectively, those goods enable the construction of a social existence. On the other hand, the “social” of social rights gains its meaning via a comparison of social rights with civil and political rights. In contrast to the latter types of rights – which are often characterized as negative forms of rights, encapsulating a right of freedom from state interference – social rights are identified as pointing to claims against the state; they demand state intervention in order to promote positive exercises of freedom. Moreover, it is often argued that social rights precede the possibility of the meaningful exercise of civil and political rights. What use are the latter forms of rights, it is suggested, if, for example, one lacks a basic education? In this second sense, then, the “social” of social rights finds its meaning by its location within a classificatory model of rights – specifically that proposed by T. H. Marshall in his essay “Citizenship and Social Class” (Marshall 1992). This chapter’s focus on obligation advances a different kind of engagement
with the “social” dimension of social rights by shifting the focus towards the form of social relations that might be thought to underpin social rights at different stages in their history. To put it another way, an exploration of the types of obligations, or duties, of citizenship accompanying social rights has the potential to reveal the prevailing principles or political philosophy that guides social rights. The second reason for this chapter’s focus on obligation is to draw attention to
the fact that social rights are not necessarily given – provisions that appear in, and can simply be read off, international covenants or countries’ constitutions; rather, social rights are fostered or developed – they emerge as the end point of a process that, it is argued here, must be investigated if we are to understand their nature
and meaning. Part of that process is the realization that (social) rights are structured by obligations; that there is a real sense in which obligations precede (social) rights. If this is so, then it is necessary to explore the precise nature of the types of obligation that structure social rights. In the context of the welfare state, this leads to a concern with the duties of citizenship, and especially with understanding their nature and how, and why, that nature might have shifted over time. What, for instance, are the political, economic, and social factors and exigencies that shape the obligations or duties of citizenship in the context of welfare? To what ends are those obligations directed? These are the kinds of questions that animate this chapter’s analysis. In summary, the claim made here is that social rights can be understood fully only if the obligations that structure them are the subject of detailed analysis. As a comprehensive treatment of how those themes play out across the various
fields of welfare is impossible within one chapter, I have chosen to contextualize the discussion by reference to unemployment policy in Britain. The first section focuses upon Sir William Beveridge’s 1942 report Social Insurance and Allied Services – considered to be the founding document of the post-World War II British welfare state – and Marshall’s seminal essay, mentioned above. In relation to the report, this section considers, inter alia, what Beveridge meant by “right”; the nature of the duties he envisaged; and what kinds of principles underpinned his recommendation of the creation of a compulsory form of social insurance. Insofar as Marshall’s essay is concerned, the discussion will look at his notion of social citizenship, and particularly at the nature of the rights and duties this entailed. The chapter then proceeds to an analysis of some recent thinking on the contemporary nature of social rights – including that of “third way” proponents and their critics. Of course, the discourse of “rights and responsibilities” has been central to “third way” ideas about how to reform the welfare state and, practically, to the formulation of social policies devised by politicians and leaders subscribing to this form of thinking. But rather than simply rehearsing this well-trodden terrain, the main aim of the chapter’s second section is to identify a correlation between some of the key themes and principles in Beveridge’s report and those emphasized by advocates of the “third way”. After illustrating how those themes have influenced contemporary academic analysis of social rights and their underlying form of social relations, it is argued that a more convincing diagnosis of these highlights the need to adapt to the exigencies of contemporary capitalism and the labour market. Thus, key themes and objectives of contemporary social policy – including the development of human capital, the fostering of entrepreneurial activity, and the focus on individual responsibility – align with the needs and exigencies of today’s labour market and markets generally, rather than being driven by a logic of protection against the vicissitudes of capitalism. The chapter’s third section looks at contemporary British unemployment policy and, specifically, workfare, together with a Supreme Court case in which the claimants challenged the legality of two workfare schemes. The analysis in this section charts the shifting contours of social rights and, importantly, their underlying obligations by juxtaposing
workfare with the earlier analysis of Beveridge’s report and Marshall’s essay. The overriding argument is that, while there may be overlapping themes and principles between the two eras, the differences are crucial and point to very different notions of obligation and visions of the social.
