ABSTRACT
One of the main functions of social rights or, more generally, of the modern welfare state, has always been the advancement of equality between citizens. For example, according to T. H. Marshall “[e]verybody would agree that the evolution of modern society has been deeply influenced in various ways by egalitarian ideas and conscious effort to put them into practice” (Marshall 1964, p63). His follower at the London School of Economics, R. M. Titmuss, reminded us that “[t]o grow in affluence […] does not mean that we should abandon the quest for equality” (Titmuss 1987, p34). The views of these early (which here means post-war) welfare state theorists are echoed by modern scholars: according to G. Esping-Andersen, “it should be evident to all that we cannot afford not to be egalitarians in the advanced economies of the twenty-first century” (Esping-Andersen 2002, p3); and F. Vandenbroucke talks of “the equality principle” as being “the very cornerstone of social democracy” (Vandenbroucke 2002, pxiv). But in what sense should the welfare state make us equal, and what kinds of
social rights are needed for this task? In this chapter I try to answer these questions by looking at the conceptions of equality at play in the writings of some wellknown welfare state scholars and by making more explicit the philosophical underpinnings of these conceptions. My aim is not to criticize these more practiceoriented writers for neglecting philosophical theorizing, nor to argue for a certain conception of equality, but rather to see whether any changes are detectable in the conceptions of equality and social rights between the post-war and contemporary welfare state eras, and also to show how complex and difficult the idea of equality is. The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I discuss T. H. Marshall’s
famous analysis of social rights in post-war welfare states. The conception of equality that emerges from this analysis is equality of welfare (which is to be attained through benefits that guarantee a minimum income and through formal equal opportunities); although, as will be seen, the route to this conception is rather complex and involves a discussion of justified inequalities as well. In the second part I look at the kind of egalitarianism that underpins the contemporary “social
investment state”. I claim that the main difference between the conceptions of post-war (mainly Marshall) and contemporary theorists (Esping-Andersen, Giddens and Rosanvallon) is that the latter are more concerned with a person’s actual opportunities or capabilities, rather than with mere formal equal opportunities. The strengthening of equal opportunities is a common reaction against the problem of social exclusion that plagues modern societies. However, some differences exist in the way contemporary theorists understand the idea of equal opportunities (and social rights). Roughly, these differences turn on the question of what role we should assign to individual merit and responsibility vis-à-vis obligations of reciprocity.
