ABSTRACT
This chapter reviews application of the 'one-world theory', and shows that even so skilful an advocate as Professor Ryle can 'make a case' only by resorting to arguments that are invariably inadequate, frequently flimsy, and at times almost openly fallacious. It also shows how the one-world theory fares with heedful operations. His solution consists essentially in a development of the 'dispositional' interpretation. According to the 'straight' dispositional interpretation, to say that a person is 'reading carefully' is to mention one overt occurrence (reading), and to 'make some open hypothetical statement' about the person reading. The chapter further shows that there are no 'intellectual acts' in the sense given to that expression by orthodox epistemologists. The intellect is usually taken to be concerned primarily with the discovery of truth. In the chapter, the author presents his analysis from the standpoint of common sense and ordinary linguistic usage, which is the standpoint from which Ryle is himself arguing.
