ABSTRACT
We have attempted to probe the possible developmental antecedents of contextual relativism in moral judgment. Contextual relativism is considered as a structural change in early adulthood (e.g., Murphy & Gilligan, 1980). There are several developmental interpretations of relativism as a feature of cognitive functioning after adolescence (Gilligan & Murphy, 1979; Kohlberg, 1984; Labouvie-Vief, 1980,1982; Perry, 1970;Riegel, 1973). All of them, in one way or another, identify either a structural inadequacy or the functional limitations of formal-operational thought when it is used in contexts of commitment and the responsibility in adulthood. As a result, they stress the connections between postadolescent cognitive development and several ego developments, including the maintenance of identity and autonomy within the context of social interaction and communication. It could be interesting, however, to look at earlier periods of the life — span in order to identify a possible continuity in certain aspects of the basic mechanism from childhood through adolescence into adulthood. If such a basic continuity does exist, then the specificity of adult development could be easier to discern as well as its dependence on earlier development.
