ABSTRACT
Australia has always had a complex and conflicted relationship with the bomb. Within this broader trend, in the late 1960s, Australia’s attitude towards the nascent Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was largely influenced by four divergent political constraints: (1) the aspiration for a nuclear weapons capability; (2) the concern that the NPT would impede Australia’s access to and development of nuclear technology; (3) the desire to limit the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in its region; and (4) the attachment to US extended nuclear deterrence. For many decades it has been assumed that Australia’s final decision to ratify the NPT in January 1973 was mainly due to specific American security assurances.2 This “nuclear umbrella” – or “extended nuclear deterrence” – is indeed often cited as one significant factor constraining the spread of nuclear weapons by obviating the need for US allies to possess their own nuclear deterrent.3
