ABSTRACT
An egalitarian understanding of justice may well be appropriate for well-ordered liberal societies (Rawls 2001, 8; Rawls 1999, Part I); it is, however, a sufficientarian understanding or a humanitarian duty of aid that is appropriate for global and intergenerational relations – or, so, John Rawls (Rawls 1999, 106, 118; Rawls 2001, 159) and others have argued (Kersting 2001; Blake 2002; Brock 2005; Miller 2005; Nagel 2005; Satz 2003; Beckermann and Pasek 2001, Part I; Meyer 2003b and 2005, chap. 2; Wall 2003). Far stronger reasons, however, speak on behalf of a sufficientarian conception of intergenerational justice than on behalf of a conception of international justice. First, there are special reasons in favour of a sufficientarian understanding of intergenerational justice. These reasons reflect an interpretation of the significance of the non-identity problem and of our uncertainty as to the consequences of our actions for the well-being of future people. Here, we will only discuss the normative implications of the non-identity problem. Second, the reasons often cited in favour of a sufficientarian understanding of global justice – namely, the undesirability of a world state, the global pluralism of conceptions of the good as well as problems of measuring relative differences globally – speak, in fact, far more strongly on behalf of a sufficientarian understanding of intergenerational justice, owing to non-contingent features of intergenerational relations. Here, we will only discuss the normative significance of problems in measuring relative differences globally and over time. Third, some of the most common instrumental reasons in favour of an egalitarian understanding do not hold for the relations among non-contemporaries.
