ABSTRACT

This chapter discusses which components of pragmatist philosophy are central to author proposal for the philosophy of social science. It demonstrates how his perspective differs from the two approaches that dominate the philosophy of social science and social research. The chapter explores the relationship between his agenda and Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology, in particular his distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. It explains how author approach draws on Levinas' conceptualization of otherness. The chapter shows that author's pragmatist-inspired proposal ties in with Hans-Georg Gadamer's dialogical notion of understanding. It shows the contemporary relevance of his proposal by focusing on the significance of social research for society. The chapter demonstrates the fruitfulness of an ongoing dialog between American neo-pragmatism and Continental philosophy which, for far too long, have been regarded as addressing irreconcilable intellectual concerns. Both philosophical strands pragmatism and existential phenomenology reject the spectator theory of knowledge according to which knowledge mirrors or captures the external world.