Palestine 1945–48: Policy, Propaganda and the Limits of Influence
This chapter examines the notional strengths of Britain's propaganda and information machinery in its campaign against Indonesian Confrontation. It investigates more broadly the final outcomes of Confrontation and the ambiguities associated with estimating the contribution of propaganda and information operations. Psychological warfare fell within the orbit of tactical psychological operations, but focused directly on influencing enemy military forces. The objectives for British propaganda and information operations were laid out formally in February 1965. Confrontation was multi-dimensional: military operations comprised one instrument; but political action, both overt and covert, was also an important tool, and this tool included significant British efforts in relation to propaganda and information operations. The Indonesian army began a systematic campaign to destroy the Indonesian Communist Party and to emasculate Sukarno. Indonesian military incursions began into Borneo in April 1963. The impact of British propaganda and information operations against Indonesia between 1963 and 1966 there is a crucial problem in distinguishing between correlation and causation.