ABSTRACT
This chapter begins with revisiting Frankfurt-style examples that purport to show that a person can be morally responsible for doing something despite not being able to do otherwise. Appealing to intrinsic “grounding” properties to meet the objection that Frankfurt examples unseat reasons-responsiveness accounts of the Guidance View may seem to propel from the fat into the fire. The appeal appears to threaten Frankfurt examples themselves. A one-way account of responsibility-level control that Frankfurt examples may induce one to uncover seemingly conflicts with Blameworthiness/Impermissibility. Rather than abandon Kant’s Law, and hence, jettison the principle that impermissibility requires avoidability, a Frankfurt defender may opt for another strategy: renouncing the principle that blameworthiness requires impermissibility. The Core dovetails well with proposed lessons of Frankfurt examples – that responsibility depends on the actual sequence of events that culminates in action, and the control that responsibility requires is “one-way” control.
