‘Lex certa’ and ‘ius certum’: The Search for Legal Certainty and Security
This chapter examines three issues related to jus natural and lax naturalism in the writings of Wilhelm Leibniz. First, Leibniz believes that legal rules or judicial laws could be drawn up with a claim to absolute truth in the sense of natural law. Second, it arises is how he intended to draw up the rules in particular. Third, the essay intends to elucidate, on the basis of the theory of compensation, what Leibniz regarded as the specific contents of natural law within the legal system. The elements of a universal jurisprudence in which the true nature of justice is elucidated and proved, both that which is pure law and by which all questions of law can be defined with geometric certainty, as well as that which is termed equity to deviate from pure law for the sake of a higher good. The ratio of natural law can thus be approached through the scientific commenting and expounding of positive law.