ABSTRACT
Until the Korean War, U.S. military conflicts generally concluded in decisive and often sudden fashion. British, Mexicans, Spanish, Confederates, Germans, and Japanese all had agreed to end hostilities on terms highly favorable to the United States and its allies. In Korea, however, the Truman administration chose to forego total war in favor of fighting a conflict limited by geography, manpower, and geopolitical considerations, most notably the threat of Soviet intervention (Weigley 1973, Foot 1985). The American concept of limited war, however, was hardly the only ingredient contributing to lengthy, erratic, and often disingenuous negotiations that produced the July 1953 armistice. Political, military, diplomatic, and economic pressures repeatedly combined to delay and disrupt the discussions taking place inside the tiny neutral zone near the 38th parallel. In the six decades following the cease-fire, examination of these factors has proven fertile ground for journalists, historians, political scientists, and policy analysts.
