ABSTRACT
This chapter considers both Nicholas Reschers's and Charles Peirce's pragmatism as a crucial element conversational and interactional rules, combining objectivity and solidarity, and they can be accounted for by a Peircean rhetoric approach, exemplified by Peirce's account of assertion. The most characteristic feature of Rescher's pragmatism in methodological Pragmatism (MP), Realistic Pragmatism (RP) and that only methods can be pragmatically justified by their success in implementation and application of their results without running into problems. The chapter focuses on the place of communication and rhetorical rules in Rescher's MP. It also focuses on Peirce's rhetorical account of assertion to see whether it is possible to explicate truth-orientation in terms of conversational contraints and non-epistemic cognitive abilities. On the level of subliminal, automatic attention aroused by the utterance of assertion, it may be that, at first, there is not much of a difference between utterance of an assertion or another type of sign, at least on the level of interactive reactions.
