ABSTRACT
This chapter explores an equivalence that has been generally taken for granted ever since its terms became available with the advent of modern philosophy. The assumed equivalence holds between self-consciousness, on the one hand, and consciousness of one's self, on the other hand, where one's self is by definition that in virtue of which one enjoys self-consciousness. Self-consciousness proves harder to characterize than its default. This chapter presents two arguments by Anscombe against CE, both of which are direct elaborations of Wittgenstein's reflections on the first person. The thetic "of-structure" of intentionality and the non-thetic "of-structure" of self-consciousness are not to be conceived as two species of a genre. The modern conception of self-consciousness according to which to enjoy self-consciousness is to bear a relation to oneself that is not contingent or to relate to oneself qua oneself rather than qua another goes far beyond the preceding characterization of self-consciousness.
