chapter  4
23 Pages

Heidegger and Wittgenstein

The Notion of a Fundamental Question and the Possibility of a Genuinely Philosophical Logic
ByOskari Kuusela

This chapter discusses the relation between Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's philosophical approaches, with reference to both their early and later works. It begins by comparing Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's different but related conceptions of philosophy as offering clarificatory reminders, and their emphasis on the differences between philosophy and factual investigations. It discusses a third issue at greater length, namely, the conception that some philosophical questions are more fundamental than others in that their solution constitutes the basis for answering other philosophical questions, and how Heidegger and Wittgenstein in different ways bring into question this conception. The chapter argues that the later Wittgenstein's rejection of the notion of a fundamental question and philosophical foundations is what enables him to develop a genuinely philosophical logic in the sense in which the early Heidegger speaks of such a logic. It explains rather than assuming metaphysics as its foundation, however, such a genuinely philosophical logic in Wittgenstein's sense constitutes its own foundation.