ABSTRACT
In his Tanner Lectures, Frans de Waal indulges in a fairly gross form of interpretive unkindness. T. H Huxley was not a veneer theorist in the sense de Waal there defines and then demolishes with the help of contemporary primatology. But despite his misreading, de Waal was nevertheless onto something. Huxley's objections to the revolutionary rhetoric of natural equality can indeed be read as an endorsement of veneer theory. It is just that the theory in question utilizes the idea of a veneer in a much more subtle and defensible manner than de Waal pretends. According to de Waal, Huxley inferred the biological superficiality of morality from a mistaken interpretation of natural selection. Whatever one makes of the metaphysics of morals and the epistemological standing of moral judgments and experiences, morality is biologically and psychologically real. Chimpanzee empathy and fairness are the central capacities de Waal cites when describing morality's biological core.
