ABSTRACT
References to the phenomenon of moral disagreement appear conspicuously in several areas in metaethics. One well-known argument—J. L. Mackie's argument from relativity—seeks to establish on the basis of widespread disagreement that moral judgments are false. Mackie deploys an argument with the form of inference to the best explanation. Another argument—whose general form goes right back to classical philosophers like Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus—seeks to establish on the basis of widespread disagreement that moral judgments lack justification. Both conclusions can properly be called versions of moral skepticism. Conciliationism offers a more direct route from moral disagreement to justification skepticism than genealogical debunking arguments, but the route is far from trouble-free. The chapter describes how Mackie's argument from disagreement is supposed to yield his preferred error-theoretic conclusion. Some have thought that disagreement with epistemic peers is so ubiquitous that a completely global skepticism follows.
