ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses how an agency theory of causation actually meets the challenge of including context dependence in the mechanistic account, proposing a pluralistic, but not relativistic view of causal attributions and scientific explanations. It aims to clarify how different explanatory levels correspond to different pragmatic interests and practical possibilities, and how this does not exclude an objective character of the notions of mechanism, level and component in specific explanatory contexts. For this purpose, it will be convenient to discuss Eronen's recent criticism of the mechanist concepts of levels, mechanisms and components. The chapter gives an historical example and discussion of cancer research. Since the very beginning, in fact, the new mechanism introduced the idea of the explanatory relevance of levels in the biological sciences. Empirical evidences of the insufficiency of some genetic account, in many cases, and of the causal relevance of epigenetic or tissue factors in the tumour development justify interesting changes in cancer research programs.
