ABSTRACT
Discussions of downward causation are invariably associated with discussions of emergence. Emergent entities affect changes in entities from which the emergent entities emerge. Proponents and opponents of emergence agree that, if entities—properties, for instance—emerge, they exert downward causal influence. Philosophers who doubt the existence, or even coherence, of downward causation doubt emergence. Those who embrace emergence do so in part to account for apparent instances of downward causation. In the case of emergence, competing accounts appear to be accounts of different phenomena. For many, particularly in the sciences, emergence pertains to prediction and explanation. A 'stronger' form of weak emergence is characterized by Mark Bedau in terms of 'macrostates' of complex systems being 'derivable' from 'microstates' 'only by simulation'. To the extent that Bedau's weak emergence is characterized by reference to derivability. An emergent law is both fundamental and independent of other fundamental laws.
