ABSTRACT
The social value management ideal is an alternative to the value-free ideal of science. It recommends that the role of non-epistemic values in scientific inquiry is analyzed, criticized, and judged as either acceptable or unacceptable by a scientific community which satisfies certain conditions. The social value management ideal is built on a contextualist understanding of epistemic justification. A contextualist understanding of epistemic justification has interesting implications for the role of non-epistemic values in evidential reasoning. The concern about exclusion is raised by Intemann and de Melo-Martín who argue that there is a tension between the requirement for tempered equality of intellectual authority and the requirement for shared standards. The concern about inclusion is brought up even more forcefully by Hicks who argues that by embracing the diversity of values, the social value management ideal is too generous toward those scientists who advance sexist and racist ideologies in science.
