ABSTRACT
My aim in revisiting these questions is twofold. First, I seek to respond to some skepticism in the literature about the value and normative force of the concept of vulnerability. Despite a recent resurgence of interest in vulnerability, that vulnerability claims have a special normative force is often simply assumed rather than explained. In response to this explanatory lacuna, some philosophers and bioethicists have expressed doubts about whether the concept of vulnerability does any explanatory work that is not already done by other moral concepts. Wrigley (2015), for example, proposes an eliminativist analysis of vulnerability, arguing that vulnerability should not be treated as a substantive ethical concept. Rather, it functions pragmatically as a linguistic marker drawing attention to the need for additional ethical scrutiny in a specific context. However, the substantive work of analyzing the ethical issues at stake in that context can be done better by other moral concepts, such as harm or exploitation. A related view has been proposed by other theorists (e.g., Hurst 2008; Martin et al. 2014) who suggest that although vulnerability does not directly generate obligations, the concept does have value in alerting us to the obligations generated by other moral claims, such as those related to welfare or respect for persons.
