ABSTRACT
Zizek's major discussions are divided between his defence of Heidegger through an unorthodox reading of his early work as a radical subjectivism and his challenge to Heidegger as nonetheless insufficiently radical in relationship to Hegel and Lacan. In the period up through 2007-8, Zizek's criticisms focus on Heidegger's politics. Zizek's recent work explores the fully ontological implications of this critique, suggesting as he already does in a 2007 text that a consistent reading of Heidegger's "unconcealment" as admitting the "horizon" of truth always to be immanent to the field of beings itself forces a properly traumatic element into our experience of finitude. Zizek's odd reliance upon and absolute rejection of Heidegger's technology-critique; an oddly unresolved inconsistency about the addressee of Zizek's own critical theory; and a perpetually repeated split between a methodological historicism and a radical anti-historicism, a split that distorts Zizek's writings on revolution in a noticeable way.
