Heck on self-conscious thoughts
Let us follow Heck in approaching “You”-thoughts indirectly, via consideration of “I”- thoughts. Heck characterises the relevant range of “I”-thoughts as “self-conscious thoughts”. About them he writes:
We can see why this is so by considering the following line of argument. The key premise in the argument is that thinking about oneself ﬁrst-personally, or self-consciously, in a way one would naturally express by the use of “I”, seems to be distinct from any way of thinking about oneself third-personally. For one might have any piece of third-personal knowledge about oneself without thereby having the analogous piece of ﬁrst-personal knowledge about oneself. For example, I might see someone in the mirror and come, on that basis, to know that that person looks tired. Unbeknownst to me, I am that person. In that case, I might fail to realise that I look tired. Thus, it is plausible that we should distinguish my thought that that person looks tired from my thought that I look tired.