ABSTRACT
Introduction Terrorists need money and resources to survive and function. The underlying logic of combating terrorist financing (CTF) is therefore straightforward: if the money can be shut down, so can the terrorist activities that it was meant to finance. It is therefore not surprising that efforts to disrupt, deter and dismantle terrorist financing networks have become the key elements of the EU’s post-9/11 counterterrorism policy. According to the 2008 EU’s Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing: ‘[b]y making it more difficult for terrorists to use their means and resources to act on their intentions, the EU protects its citizens as effectively as possible. And financial tools, used proactively, are highly beneficial in the identification of terrorist networks and development of counter-terrorist intelligence’.1 Moreover, according to the original 2004 EU Strategy on Terrorist Financing: ‘[a]s well as reducing the financial flows to terrorists and disrupting their activities, action to counter terrorist
ARTICLE
Introduction Terrorists need money and resources to survive and function. The underlying logic f combating terrorist financing (CTF) is therefore straightforward: if the mo ey can be shut down, so can the terrorist activities that it was meant to finance. It is therefore not surprising that efforts to disrupt, deter and dismantle terrorist financing netw rks have become the key elements of the EU’s post-9/11 c unterterrorism policy. According to the 2008 EU’s Revised Strategy on Terrorist Financing: ‘[b]y making it more difficult for terrorists to use their means and resources to act on their intentions, the EU protects its citizens as effectively as possible. And financial tools, used proactively, are highly beneficial in the identification of terrorist networks and development of counter-terrorist intelligence’.1 Moreover, accor ing to the original 2004 EU Strategy on Terrorist Fi ancing: ‘[a]s well as reducing the fi ancial flows to terrorists and disrupting their activities, action to counter terrorist
financing can provide vital information on terrorists and their networks, which in turn improves law enforcement agencies’ ability to undertake successful investigations’.2 This corresponds to the prevailing wisdom on CTF in the academic
literature, which suggests that terrorist financing leaves: ‘a financial footprint that allows us to trace financial flows, unravel terrorist financing networks, and uncover terrorist sleeper cells’.3 Thus, if successfully executed, CTF measures should also mitigate the first mover advantage terrorist otherwise hold. In some cases, limiting the available resources: ‘may prevent some attacks from taking place, or at least can reduce the impact of attacks that cannot be prevented’.4 In addition, CTF efforts should also help to track operatives, chart relationships, and deter individuals from supporting terrorist organizations both directly5 and indirectly, through diversion of funds from charitable and other organizations.6 Moreover, unlike much of the other evidence gathered relating to terrorism, which can be: ‘suspect, the product of interrogation, rewards, betrayals, deceits . . . afinancial recorddoesn’t lie’.7As such, it can be more reliable than other forms of intelligence when it comes to reconstructing events after terrorist attacks and gaining better understanding of the terrorist group’s modus operandi and internal organization. In fact, according to some experts, we may actually be witnessing a: ‘recalibration of CTF strategy with a growing emphasis on the strategic and operational value of financial intelligence (FINITN) rather than money per say’.8 There also appears to be a general consensus that, given the global nature
and/or through states funding foreign groups as proxies for the achievement of their own foreign policy goals. After 9/11, however:
[T]he advent of self-supporting ‘nomadic terrorist networks’ with global or regional, rather than separatist, goals, such as Al Qaeda, has added a new dimension to the problem. A nomadic group moves between jurisdictions and operates in different jurisdictions. It can obtain its financing in one region, but carry out operations by means of active cells stationed in, or transferred to, another region.10
