ABSTRACT
What explains the way European Union (EU) police cooperation has evolved, and where is it headed? These two basic questions were fundamental to research that I first undertook in 1998 as I prepared to present a conference paper on the European Police Office (Europol). This work ultimately culminated in a book with a broader focus that I completed in February 2002, before it came to press during the next year.1 I return here to the analytical framework introduced in that book, as well those two key questions at its heart. By addressing these issues, this article not only advances our understanding of EU police cooperation, but also its contribution to counterterrorism (CT) – past, present and future. The main argument of my book was that EU police cooperation was
moving in the direction of supranationalism, and its development in this regard could be explained in terms of the same internal and external factors
ARTICLE
What explains the way European Union (EU) police cooperatio h s evolved, and w ere is it headed? These two b sic questions were fundamental to research that I first undertook in 1998 as I prepared to present a conference paper on the European Police Office (Europ l). This work ultimately culminated in a book with a broader focus that I completed in Febru ry 2002, before it came t press during the next year.1 I return here to the analytical framework introduced in that book, as well those two key questions at its heart. By addressing these issues, this article not only advances our understanding of EU police cooperation, but also its contribution to counterterroris (CT) – past, present and future. The main argument of my book was that EU police cooperatio was
moving in the direction of supranationalis , and its development in this regard could be explained in terms of the same internal and external factors
that help explain the evolution of European integration in general. In this article, I refine my original analytical framework in light of key events since 2002, as well as noteworthy scholarly contributions about these. My new model includes the conceptual category of ‘interest shapers,’ which encompasses a revised collection of variables first identified in my book. The new framework also draws on recent scholarship and identifies develops a concept of ‘institutional’ dynamics that entails phenomena neglected in my original study. This article first provides a brief summary of my original framework and
then applies this to the period since 2002, especially the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty and the decision to transform Europol into an official EU agency. Given the focus of this special edition, I will also explore key events and issues related to EU cooperation on CT. After this, the original analytical model itself will be critically examined to determine whether any variables can be eliminated because they are no longer salient. I will also make the case that other factors should be included, particularly institutional dynamics. The article concludes by using the new model to consider the future path of EU police cooperation, including its likely supranational nature and role in CT.
Original Model: From Trevi to Supranationalism My book covered the initial development of Europol, but its focus was broader, including the overall development of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), especially police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The main dependent variable in the book was the development of supranationalism in EU police cooperation, for which I identified several indicators. Regarding the EU’s main governmental institutions, a shift in the direction of supranationalism would entail the expansion of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council and enhanced powers for the Commission, European Parliament (EP) and Court of Justice. Meanwhile, a more supranational Europol would be evidenced by its nature and activities being less determined by member states and their potential vetoes and more by the EU’s supranational institutions. Europol would also have a wider policy remit, more day-to-day autonomy, and increased operational capabilities, including those independent of member state authorities.2 After examining developments since the 1970s, I argued that police and judicial cooperation in the EU was, in fact, moving in the direction of supranationalism. I argued further that this development had been pushed along most
significantly by two sets of variables, namely ‘external factors’ and ‘functional spillover.’ The former includes forces such as the end of the Cold War and its effect on the central and eastern European countries (CEECs), while the latter refers to the phenomenon by which EU policy in one area contributes to the perceived need for European integration in another. To a lesser extent, ‘federalism’ also helps explains the development supranationalism and refers to ideological support for European approaches 2
